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Introduction
AT AN ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL in Taylor, Michigan, a group of
approximately 181 registered nurses ("RNs") took initial steps towards
organizing a union with the United Auto Workers of America
("UAW").' The RNs and the UAW filed a petition with the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB") to form a single bargain-
ing unit for the purpose of bargaining collectively with the RNs' em-
ployer over wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.2 Soon
after, the employer challenged the inclusion of twelve charge nurses
in the bargaining unit, claiming that the nurses were supervisors and
* Class of 2008; B.A. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1996; Editor-in-Chief,
U.S.E Law Review, Volume 42. I would like to thank my editor, Marissa McKinster, for her
insightful suggestions and hard work bringing this Note to publication. I am also grateful
to Professors Michelle Travis and Maria Ontiveros for their guidance and support in
developing the ideas and arguments that I present here. Finally, I would like to thank my
wife Elena, who inspires me every day with her compassion, intelligence, and integrity.
1. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *1-6
(Sept. 29, 2006). According to their website, "[t]he UAW represents a large and growing
number of technical, office and professional workers ... in the public sector, health care,
schools and universities, telecommunications and news media." UAW Homepage, http://
www.uaw.org/about/members.html (presenting a "profile of the UAW membership by sec-
tor") (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
2. See Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *1-6; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(b)
(2000) (defining purposes of collective bargaining and setting out procedures for deter-
mining bargaining unit composition).
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therefore excluded from coverage under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("Act"). 3
The twelve charge nurses in question were RNsjust like all of the
other nurses in the proposed bargaining unit.4 In addition to their
normal RN duties, however, these charge nurses also matched other
members of the nursing staff with particular patients or locations
within the hospital.5 Besides their ability to distribute work amongst
their coworkers in this way, the charge nurses did not have any mana-
gerial authority. They had no formal role in the employee grievance
procedure and did not represent management in other matters relat-
ing to employee status.6
The charge nurses sat nearly at the bottom of the hospital's chain
of command. Each charge nurse answered directly to a clinical man-
ager who had responsibility for the budget, work schedules, and policy
of the nursing unit, and also did all of the hiring, firing, and disciplin-
ing of employees. 7 The clinical managers, in turn, reported to clinical
supervisors who made daily rounds of all the nursing units and took
responsibility for adequate unit staffing.8 At the top of the nursing
hierarchy was the nurse site leader.9
On September 29, 2006, in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.,t0 the Board
announced its decision that these twelve charge nurses were statutory
supervisors under the Act and therefore did not fall under the Act's
coverage." The Board held that the charge nurses' assigning their
coworkers to particular patients or hospital locations constituted an
exercise of supervisory authority that required independent judg-
ment.' 2 This exercise of authority brought the nurses within the Act's
3. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *1-2. The National Labor Relations Act con-
sists of the original Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Taft-Hartley Amendments
(Labor Management Relations Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act), Pub. L. No.86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959), and the Health Care Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Star. 395
(1974). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) for the current codified version of the Act. The
Act also created and empowered the Board to carry out the Act's mandates. See id. § 153
and infra Part I.B for a discussion of the structure and procedure of the Board.
4. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *6-7.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *112 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting).
7. Id. at *111.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *110-11. The nurse site leader is "a position comparable to a director of
nursing in other hospitals." Id.
10. 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448 (Sept. 29, 2006).
11. Id. at *4.
12. Id. at *48-64.
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supervisory exemption and therefore excluded them from the bar-
gaining unit.1
3
In Oakwood, the Board incorrectly held that this group of charge
nurses, with only minor supervisory duties, fell within the Act's super-
visory exemption. 14 By creating a definition of supervisor that relies
on dictionary definitions of the statutory text rather than on contem-
porary workplace realities, the Board subverted Congress's intent in
passing the Act-to encourage collective bargaining as a means of cre-
ating industrial peace and promoting fuller worker participation in
the larger society.1 5
This decision is both an illustration of and the result of the
Board's increasing political polarization and isolation from the indus-
trial relations environment that Congress charged it with regulating.
Congress should remedy this situation, and avoid stripping possibly
millions of American workers of their collective bargaining rights,16 by
amending the Act's definition of supervisor to more accurately reflect
the dynamics of the modern workplace.
Although Congress expressly covered professional employees
under the Act,17 the Act's ambiguous definition of supervisor com-
bined with the Supreme Court's narrow textual interpretation of that
definition have seriously constricted the Board's ability to certify bar-
gaining units containing workers with professional skills or training.
Further, the recent trend of highly partisan presidential appointments
to the Board spurred a series of Board decisions that have considera-
bly dampened workers' ability to exercise the broad organizing and
collective bargaining rights granted by section seven of the Act.18 In
the current atmosphere in which the Board has faltered in its ability to
carry out the national labor policy of encouraging unionization and
13. Id. at *4. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (2000) for the text of the Act's supervisory
exemption.
14. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *4.
15. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of Congress's goals in passing the Act.
16. See Ross EISENBREY & LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SUPERVISOR
IN NAME ONLY: UNION RIGHTS OF EIGHT MILLION WORKERS AT STAKE IN LABOR BOARD RUL-
ING (2006), available at http://www.epinet.org/issuebriefs/225/ib225.pdf (demonstrating
that the Board's decision in Oakwood "would strip 8 million more workers of their right to
participate in a union and bargain collectively, adding to the approximately 8.6 million
first-line supervisors that the GAO estimates have already been excluded by prior interpre-
tations of the NLRA").
17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12).
18. Id. § 157. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent
Board decisions restricting labor rights under the Act.
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collective bargaining, 19 the proper forum for enforcing the rights of
workers is the legislative branch.
Part I of this Note will provide background information on the
origins and purposes of the two major pieces of labor legislation at
issue-the Wagner Act of 193520 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 194721-
as well as the major Supreme Court decisions interpreting them. Part
II will explain and analyze both the majority and dissenting opinions
in Oakwood, especially in terms of their respective interpretations of
the statutory terms "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent
judgment."22 Part III will argue that the Oakwood majority's expansive
interpretation of the Act's supervisory exemption contradicts congres-
sional intent and the national labor policy of encouraging collective
bargaining. Part IV will argue further that the Oakwood majority's mis-
interpretation of the statutory language both stems from and illus-
trates the Board's increasing alienation and political polarization. The
Note concludes by advocating for congressional action to amend the
Act as the best means to bring the statutory definition of supervisor in
line with modern workplace realities. 23
I. The Statutory Bases for the National Labor Relations Act's
Supervisory Exclusion
A. The Twin Purposes of the Act: Industrial Peace & Worker
Empowerment
In 1935, Congress passed legislation that to this day remains the
underlying basis of United States labor law.24 As the centerpiece of the
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to encourag[e] the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and... protect[ ] the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and protection.
Id.
20. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (2000)).
21. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166 (2000)).
22. These statutory terms are found in the Act's definition of "supervisor." 29 U.S.C.
§ 161.
23. In writing this Note, I have consciously decided not to propose specific statutory
language to fix the Act's definition of "supervisor" to better reflect the increasing profes-
sionalization and flattening hierarchies of the contemporary workplace. Because a contex-
tually-accurate definition of that term must be rooted in the on-the-ground realities of
workers, I am in no better a position than the courts or the Board to propose language that
would reflect these realities. The thesis of this Note is simply that the proper forum for
deciding what constitutes a supervisor in the modern economy is the legislative branch.
24. See 49 Stat. 449.
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New Deal, the Wagner Act established the basic right of workers to
unionize and bargain collectively with their employers.2 5 Two basic
policy considerations motivated the Act's supporters in Congress: (1)
encouraging collective bargaining as a means of managing labor rela-
tions to achieve greater industrial peace 26 and (2) promoting unioni-
zation as a vehicle for allowing workers to participate more fully in the
sociopolitical life of the nation. 27 While political expediency caused
the first purpose to feature more prominently in the eventual statu-
tory text, both purposes were of critical importance to the Act's
supporters. 28
1. Industrial Peace
The legislative goal of industrial peace resonated strongly with
conservative politicians and business interests that the bill's supporters
had to appease to win passage. 29 Supporters of the Act argued that
allowing workers to organize would reduce friction between labor and
management and therefore remove a central cause of strikes. 30 As the
opening paragraph of the Act states:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organ-
ize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce .... 31
By expressly adopting a national labor policy of encouraging union
organization and collective bargaining, Congress intended to provide
an administrative vehicle through which workers and their employers
could amicably resolve disputes.
In fact, the Act gained passage in the wake of an enormous wave
of strikes, many of them violent, across the country.3 2 According to
25. REBECCA ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 63 (2006).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
27. Unionization promotes a form of social citizenship that Rebecca Zietlow refers to
as "rights of belonging." ZIETLOW, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 64 (stating that "supporters of the Wagner Act in Congress ... framed the
act in two different registers: as a means of protecting human freedom and of regulating
interstate commerce").
29. Business interests, including the National Association of Manufacturers, feared
the Wagner Act's "collective view of labor relations" and undertook a major lobbying cam-
paign to defeat it. ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 74.
30. Id. at 79.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)).
32. In 1934, 1.47 million workers, or 51.5% of the nation's workforce, participated in
1856 strikes. IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER (1933-1941): TuRmu-
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supporters of the Act, denial of employees' right to organize caused
many of these strikes, which in turn interfered with interstate com-
merce.33 Allowing workers to organize into unions would have a bene-
ficial effect on the economy by reducing the number of strikes and
decreasing the militancy of labor.34 In the words of then Board chief
Lloyd Garrison in testimony before the Senate Labor Committee, the
Act was the nation's "chief bulwark against communism and other rev-
olutionary movements." 35
2. Worker Empowerment
In contrast to this conservative view of labor rights, American la-
bor leaders had long viewed the right to unionize as necessary to allow
workers to participate fully in a democratic society.3 6 Union member-
ship not only provided workers with collective leverage to make con-
crete changes in their immediate working environments, but also gave
them a vehicle with which to influence policy at all levels, especially as
unions began to grow more powerful politically. 37 These labor leaders
saw the right to unionize not only as a fundamental human right,38
but also as a constitutional right.3 9
Senator Wagner, the Act's namesake and chief sponsor, adopted
this "version of popular constitutionalism" when he advocated for the
bill on the floor of the Senate. 40 Wagner and the bill's other sponsors,
however, were highly cognizant of the fact that, in addition to garner-
ing political support for a statutory right to unionize, the legislation
had to pass muster with the conservative Supreme Court.41 While New
Deal members of Congress spoke about the bill as a means of promot-
ing basic human rights and freedom, they framed the actual language
LENT YEARS 217 (1969); R.W. Fleming, The Significance of the Wagner Act, zn LABOR AND THE
NEW DEAL 123, 131 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young eds., 1957).
33. ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 79.
34. See id.
35. National Labor Relations Board: Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Education and
Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong. 125 (1935).
36. See ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 67.
37. See id. at 65.
38. Id. at 64-65.
39. Labor leaders saw collective bargaining rights as rooted in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equality, the Thirteenth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from
involuntary servitude, and the free speech and expression rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment. This constitutional philosophy of labor rights became known as "labor's con-
stitution of freedom." ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 65 (citingJames Gray Pope, Labor's Consti-
tution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997)).
40. Id. at 75.
41. Id. at 76.
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of the bill in terms of removing burdens to interstate commerce to
survive inevitable constitutional challenges. 42
In contrast to the business-friendly narrative that congressional
advocates used to shepherd the bill to passage, Senator Wagner spoke
explicitly about the Act as a mechanism to promote industrial democ-
racy and, by extension, greater participation of workers in the civic life
of the nation. 43 Many cosponsors made the direct connection between
choosing one's representatives in the workplace and choosing one's
representatives in government.44 In the words of one House member,
"The worker's right to form labor unions and to bargain collectively is
as much his right as his right to participate through delegated repre-
sentatives in the making of laws which regulate his civic conduct. Both
are inherent rights. '45 Although the Act's worker empowerment pur-
pose was not ultimately incorporated into the statutory text, the legis-
lative history clearly indicates that giving workers a stronger voice in
national politics was a central goal of the Act's primary sponsors.
B. National Labor Relations Board: Structure and Procedure
In addition to granting employees the basic rights to organize
themselves into unions and bargain collectively with their employers,
the Act also created an administrative agency charged with overseeing
representation elections and adjudicating disputes arising within its
purview. 46 Currently, the Board consists of five members who are ap-
pointed by the President of the United States for five-year terms.47
One member of the Board, chosen by the President, serves as its
Chair.48 The Act also provides for a General Counsel of the Board,
also appointed by the President, who has authority to investigate all
charges brought under the Act, and to issue and prosecute complaints
based on those charges. 49
The Board administers the broad organizing and bargaining
rights granted to employees in section seven of the Act through two
basic types of cases: representation cases and complaint (or unfair la-
42. Id. (citing William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DuKE L.J. 165,
198 (2001)).
43. Id. at 78.
44. Id.
45. 79 CONG. REc. 9061 (1934) (statement of Rep. Carpenter).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2000).
47. Id. § 153(a).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 153(d).
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bor practice) cases. 50 The procedure for these cases is laid out by the
Act in sections nine and ten respectively.51 Representation cases occur
when one of the parties involved files a petition to determine whether
a particular labor organization should be certified as the exclusive
representative of the employees in a particular bargaining unit.52 The
Board's Regional Director then decides whether to dismiss the peti-
tion or order a secret ballot election of the bargaining unit
employees. 53
Complaint cases occur when one party files a "charge" that an-
other party has engaged in an unfair labor practice. 54 Individuals and
organizations covered by the Act do not have a private right of action
in unfair labor practice cases but must go through the Board's admin-
istrative procedures. 55 If the Board's Regional Director finds that the
charge has merit, he or she will issue a complaint.56 A Board attorney
will prosecute the charge in a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ").57 The ALJ then submits a recommended decision to
the Board, which becomes the decision of the Board if neither party
files exceptions to the decision within twenty days.58 In the event of
such exceptions, the Board will issue its own decision based on the
ALJ's recommendation, the exceptions and briefs of the parties, and
the hearing record.5 9 The Board may also hear oral argument.60 The
Board may seek enforcement of its orders, and aggrieved parties may
obtain judicial review of those orders in appropriate circuit courts of
appeals. 61
50. WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY
192 (5th ed. 2002).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 192-93.
53. Id. at 193.
54. Id. at 194.
55. While covered parties do not have direct access to federal courts in unfair labor
practice cases, the Act does provide a private right of action in a federal district court for
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
56. OBERER ET AL., supra note 50, at 194.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 195.
59. Id.
60. Id. For a discussion of the role of oral argument in Oakwood, see infra notes
254-63 and accompanying text.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2000).
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C. The Taft-Hartley Amendments and Exclusion of Supervisors
from Statutory Protection
The explosive growth of union membership after passage of the
Act, and the dramatic increase in union political strength which fol-
lowed, caused significant blowback from the business community.
6 2
Many business leaders and conservative politicians believed that un-
ions began to abuse their newfound bargaining power to make unfair
demands on employers. 63 In response, Congress amended the Wag-
ner Act with the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.64 The Taft-Hartley Act
placed new and significant limits on workers' statutory right to form
unions.65 One of the most significant of these limits was Congress's
exclusion of "supervisors" from protection under the Act.
66
The original Wagner Act did not expressly exclude any particular
categories of employees. The only distinction made by the Act was
between employers, defined as "any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly,"6 7 and employees, defined in circular
terms as "any employee. '68 Employees enjoyed broad organizing and
collective bargaining rights under the Act, codified in section seven as
the right "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 69 Because
the Act expressly granted protection only to employees, much turned
on whether a particular worker or group of workers fell within that
statutory category.
62. FOSTER R. DULLES & MELVYN DUBOFSKv, LABOR IN AMERICA 343-48 (4th ed. 1966).
63. Id. at 343.
64. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166
(2000)).
65. Some of the Taft-Hartley Act provisions aimed at scaling back union bargaining
power included banning the closed shop, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes, and
union political contributions, in addition to permitting individual states to pass "right-to-
work" laws which ban the union shop. DULLES & DUBOFSKV, supra note 62, at 344-45. Labor
leaders at the time called the legislation a "deliberate and monstrous movement ... to
cripple if not destroy, the labor movement." Id. at 344.
66. SeeTaft-Hartley Act, sec. 101, § 2(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(2000)); Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of Professional and Supervisory Status:
Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in LABOR LAW STORIES 353, 356 (LauraJ. Cooper & Cathe-
rine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
67. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) ("in the interest" language replaced with "as an agent")).
68. Wagner Act § 2(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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1. Manufacturing Foreman Organizing Efforts: An Early Test for
the Wagner Act
Manufacturing foremen, who acted as front-line supervisors in
the industrial context, did not fit neatly into either the statutory defi-
nition of employer or employee.70 When faced with the issue of where
to place foremen under the Act, the Board initially adopted a dual-
role approach, categorizing them as employers when they committed
violations of the Act in relation to subordinate employees but as em-
ployees when they themselves attempted to form unions y.7 In fact,
foremen began to unionize in large numbers in the early 1940s,
largely in response to the tremendous gains they witnessed factory
workers achieve through collective bargaining. 72
Employers feared the rise in foreman unionization efforts for sev-
eral reasons. Unionizing had the potential to shift the loyalties of fore-
men away from management and towards their union sisters and
brothers. 73 Employers depended on foremen to act on their behalf to
promote a disciplined and well-ordered working environment, and a
shift in foreman loyalty could significantly interfere with that goal.74
Relatedly, a foreman's union would likely honor the picket lines of
other striking unions, or could even go on strike itself.75 Business had
a strong interest in working to deprive foremen of the organizing and
collective bargaining rights that the Board had granted them based on
the Act's broad definition of "employee."
2. Taft-Hartley's Changes to the Act's Definition of "Employee"
Largely in response to the Board's expansive view of the statutory
definition of "employee," which by that time encompassed not only
foremen but also plant guards and independent contractors,7 6 the
newly Republican Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. 7 7
The new law expressly excluded supervisors-along with independent
70. A foreman is "a chief and often specially trained workman who works with and
commonly leads a gang or crew" or "a representative of an owner or management in au-
thority over a group of workers, a particular process or operation, a section of a plant or an
entire organization." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 889 (3d ed. 1993).
71. See NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationary Co., 113 F.2d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1940).
72. See Weiss, supra note 66.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947) (plant guards);
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947) (plant guards); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns,
Inc., 322 U.S. 11] (1944) (independent contractors).
77. See Weiss, supra note 66, at 359.
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contractors-from the Act's definition of employee, and in so doing
removed their statutory organizing and collective bargaining rights.
78
Taft-Hartley's constricted definition of employee encouraged busi-
nesses to "label even low-level workers as supervisors and to reorganize
job responsibilities for reasons unrelated to economic performance
simply to maximize statutory exclusions. 7
9
While Congress excluded supervisors from coverage under the
Act, it maintained protection for "professional" employees.80 The
Taft-Hartley Act expressly granted collective bargaining rights to pro-
fessionals, whom Congress defined explicitly in the new section
2(12),81 although it provided that professionals and non-professionals
must have separate bargaining units unless a majority of the profes-
sionals voted for a single combined unit.
8 2
Congress's concurrent exclusion of supervisors and inclusion of
professionals would soon cause significant interpretive difficulties for
both the Board and the courts. The significant potential for overlap
between the two classifications created a danger that one category
could come to engulf the other, subverting Congress's intent in the
process.
78. "The term 'employee' ... shall not include.., any individual having the status of
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor ...." 29 U.S.C.§ 152(3) (2000).
79. See Weiss, supra note 66, at 361.
80. Congress rejected an earlier bill seeking to amend the Act which would have ex-
pressly excluded professionals. Smith Bill, H.R. 1996, 78th Cong. (1943); see also H.R. 2239,
78th Cong. § 3 (1943).
81. The term 'professional employee' means-
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its perform-
ance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accom-
plished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv)
requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning custom-
arily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and
study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the
performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or (b) any em-
ployee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction
and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related
work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become
a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12).
82. Id. § 159(b) (1).
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D. The Health Care Amendments Act of 1974
In addition to exempting supervisors from statutory protection,
the Taft-Hartley Act also removed much of the protection that the
Wagner Act had provided to employees of health-care institutions.8 3
Most private-sector health-care employees went without statutory pro-
tection for organizing and collective bargaining until Congress passed
the Health Care Amendments of 1974, which expressly brought all
health-care institutions under the Act's coverage.8 4 Congress took this
action in response to a wave of recognitional strikes85 in exempt non-
profit hospitals that seriously disrupted patient care.8 6
Legislators believed that by restoring an administrative forum for
seeking union recognition and resolving workplace disputes, health-
care workers would have less impetus to engage in recognitional
strikes which interrupted delivery of care.8 7 Congress also sought to
allow health-care workers to organize in order to remedy the deterio-
rating pay and working conditions in the industry, which were drain-
ing top talent from the field and negatively impacting patient care. 88
Once health-care employees regained statutory protection under
the Act, and the Court affirmed the Board's rules concerning the
composition of health-care bargaining units, union organizing in the
industry began to increase steadily.8 9 Because of the unusually large
proportion of state-licensed professionals in the health-care field, that
industry soon became the locus of much litigation over the Taft-Hart-
ley Act's supervisory exemption.90
E. Taft-Hartley's Definition of Supervisor
Section 2 (11) of the Taft-Hartley Act defined a "supervisor" as:
[A] ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, as-
83. Weiss, supra note 66, at 361. The Taft-Hartley Act "amended the § 2(2) definition
of 'employer' to exempt non-profit hospitals." Id.
84. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(14), 158(d), (g)).
85. Recognitional strikes generally use economic coercion to pressure an employer to
recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining agent of a group of employees without going
through the Board election procedure. See OBERER ET AL., supra note 50, at 379.
86. Weiss, supra note 66, at 397. According to congressional testimony at the time,
recognitional strikes accounted for ninety-five percent of the strikes in non-profit hospitals.
Id. at 362.
87. Id. at 397.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 363.
90. See id. at 362-63.
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sign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.9 t
This definition creates a three-part test to determine whether a
particular worker is excluded from coverage under the Act due to su-
pervisory status. 92 A worker is a supervisor if: (1) the worker possesses
at least one of the twelve types of personnel authority enumerated in
§ 2(11); (2) the worker exercises that authority "in the interest of the
employer"; and (3) the worker's exercise of that authority "requires
the use of independent judgment" and "is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature."93
In formulating its definition of what constitutes a supervisor
under the Act, Congress intended to exclude foremen from the Act's
protection.9 4 Unlike "straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other
minor supervisory employees," whom Congress intended to cover
under the Act, foremen were "supervisor[s] vested with such genuine
management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or
make effective recommendations with respect to such action."95 The
Act's legislative history expressly distinguished between "minor super-
visory employees" and bona fide supervisors with real management
authority.96 This distinction demonstrates that Congress did not in-
tend to exclude broad categories of workers with little power to affect
the terms and conditions of employment from coverage under the
Act.
F. Supervisor or Professional? The Supreme Court's Expansive
Interpretation of Taft-Hartley's Defimition of Supervisor
A persistent challenge in interpreting the Act's definition of "su-
pervisor," a category expressly excluded from coverage, stems from its
apparent overlap with the Act's definition of "professional employee,"
an expressly covered category. While the Act excludes workers as su-
pervisors if they use "independent judgment"97 in exercising author-
91. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
92. See id.
93. Id.; see NLRB v. Health Care Ret. Corp. of Am. (HCR), 511 U.S. 571, 573-74
(1994) (citing Nw. Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993)).
94. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 4-5 (1947). Senator Taft expressed the concern that "man-
agement will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen." Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
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ity, its coverage of professional employees turns on "consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment."98 The centrality of "judgment"
in both definitions presents a danger that a broad interpretation of
one term could remove all meaning from the other.
1. Background: Seminal Supreme Court Decisions
The inherent tension between these definitions has given rise to a
string of Board and Supreme Court decisions placing various groups
of workers into one or the other of the two categories-and either
denying or granting the right to unionize accordingly.99 Contrary to
Congress's intent in passing the Taft-Hartley Act, these decisions have
tended towards excluding ever-increasing categories of professional
employees as statutory supervisors. This trend has come to the fore
most prominently in the health-care context, a setting in which a high
proportion of employees have some degree of professional back-
ground and training.100
While Congress expressly granted professional employees statu-
tory protection under the Act, the Court has read the Act's exclusion
of supervisors broadly and excluded several new categories of workers
from coverage on that basis. 10 1 The Court rationalized these decisions
on the grounds that the "employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty
98. Id. § 152(12) (a) (ii).
99. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (finding six
Registered Nurses fell within the supervisory exclusion); NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp.
of Am. (HCR), 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (finding four Licensed Practicing Nurses fell within the
supervisory exclusion); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (finding university
faculty fall within supervisory exclusion); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
(finding workers with "managerial" responsibilities fall within the supervisory exclusion).
"There may be some tension between the Act's exclusion of managerial employees and its
inclusion of professionals, since most professionals in managerial positions continue to
draw on their special skills and training." Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686.
100. For example, "[i]n all States and the District of Columbia, students must graduate
from an approved nursing program and pass a national licensing examination ... in order
to obtain a nursing license." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPA-
TIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2008-09), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos083.htm#
training (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). "All four advanced practice nursing specialties require
at least a master's degree.... In some States, certification in a specialty is required in order
to practice that specialty." Id. The supervisory or non-supervisory status of nurses has been
the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Ky. River, 532 U.S. 706; HCR 511 U.S. 571.
101. See Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 706 (registered nurses); HCR, 511 U.S. 571 (licensed
practical nurses); Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682 (university faculty); Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (managerial employees).
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of its representatives,"' 02 which, in its view, justified an implied exclu-
sion of "managerial" employees.10 3
Although the Board initially interpreted the supervisory exclu-
sion to cover only those managers involved directly in labor relations,
the Supreme Court rejected that interpretation in NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. 10 4 The Bell Aerospace Court interpreted the supervisory exclu-
sion much more broadly to cover any "executives who formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative
decisions of their employer."'0 5
In NLRB v. Yeshiva University,'0 6 the Court used the broad mana-
gerial exclusion that it created in Bell Aerospace to exclude university
faculty from coverage under the Act.10 7 The Court viewed the power
of faculty to determine the day-to-day operations of the educational
environment of the university as managerial in nature.'08 The Yeshiva
Court justified its exclusion of university faculty on the grounds that
"the faculty determines . . . the product to be produced, the terms
upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served,"
all of which it saw as part of the decision-making power of
management. 09
While the Court construed the managerial exclusion broadly, it
made clear that the statutory coverage of professionals remained in-
tact, as Congress mandated in section 2(12).110 The Yeshiva decision
explicitly distinguished the university faculty context from the health-
care context, where the Board had previously held that nurses were
professionals covered under the Act "despite substantial planning re-
sponsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members.""'1
The Yeshiva Court positively referenced the Board's practice of asking
"in each case whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or super-
visory are 'incidental to' or 'in addition to' the treatment of
patients."' 12
102. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682.
103. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 275, 286.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 86 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947)).
106. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
107. Id. at 686.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 690 & n.30.
111. Id. (citing Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951-52 (1970), en-
forced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973)).
112. Id.
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In NLRJB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., I -" a
case decided soon after Yeshiva, the Court narrowed its managerial
exclusion to encompass employees with access to the business's pri-
vate labor-relations records, without excluding employees with access
only to non-labor-relations information.1 14 In justifying its tempering
of the managerial exclusion, the Hendricks County Court pointed to the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, which indicated that Con-
gress intended to "confine[ ] the definition of supervisor to individu-
als generally regarded as foremen and employees of like or higher
rank."115 In adopting legislative language that explicitly covered pro-
fessionals, the conference committee rejected the House bill's more
expansive definition of "supervisor," which would have reached many
confidential and professional employees. 116 Quoting the legislative
history of the Act, the Court stated that " [i] t would .. . be extraordi-
nary to read an implied exclusion for confidential employees into the
statute that would swallow up . . . the professional-employee
inclusion."' 1 7
In NRLB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America ("HCR') ,118
the Court faced the question of whether the Act covered a particular
group of nurses as professionals or excluded them as supervisors. 19
The Board found that the employer retaliated against four licensed
practical nurses ("LPNs") for protected concerted activities. 120 The
Board concluded that the nurses were not supervisors under section
2(11) because their "direction of less-skilled employees, in the exer-
cise of professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients,
is not authority exercised 'in the interest of the employer.'"121
In reversing the Board's decision, the HCR Court made clear that
the Board could no longer rely on the "in the interest of the em-
ployer" prong of section 2(11) alone to differentiate between profes-
sional and supervisory workers in the health-care context. 1 22 The
113. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
114. Id. at 189-90.
115. Id. at 183 n.15, 184-85 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 36 (1947) and 93 CONG.
REC. 6442 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft)).
116. Id. at 184-85.
117. Id. at 185.
118. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
119. Id. at 573-74.
120. Id. at 574-75.
121. Id. at 574 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, HCR 511 U.S. 571 (No. 92-
1964)).
122. Id. at 579 ("The Board. .. has placed exclusive reliance on the 'in the interest of
the employer' language in § 2(11) .... The interpretation of the 'in the interest of the
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Court warned the Board against reading the "in the interest of the
employer" prong in a way that removed any meaning from the
"responsibly to direct" prong.' 23
2. The Supreme Court's Last Word on the Supervisory Exemption:
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.
The Court's jurisprudence on the statutory exclusion of supervi-
sors culminated in 2001 with its decision in NLRB v. Kentucky River
Community Care, Inc.124 In that case, the employer challenged the
Board's inclusion of six RNs in a bargaining unit that won union rep-
resentation at a psychiatric rehabilitation and long-term care facil-
ity. 125 The Board found that the nurses were covered professional
employees under section 2(12) of the Act and were not supervisors
under section 2(11) of the Act. 126 The Kentucky River Court over-
turned the Board's decision, rejecting the Board's conclusion that
"employees do not use 'independent judgment' when they exercise
'ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled
employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified
standards.' "127
The Kentucky River Court did acknowledge the validity of two im-
portant elements of the Board's position: (1) "the statutory term 'in-
dependent judgment' is ambiguous with respect to the degree of
discretion required for supervisory status"; and (2) "the degree of
judgment that might ordinarily be required to conduct a particular
task may be reduced below the statutory threshold by detailed orders
and regulations issued by the employer."' 28 The Court, however, took
issue with the Board's interpretation of the "independent judgment"
prong of section 2 (11) where it allowed a particular kind, rather than
degree, ofjudgment to fall outside the supervisory exclusion-specifi-
cally, the "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing
less-skilled employees to deliver services."1 29 Because nearly all super-
visoryjudgment is based on "professional or technical skill or experi-
employer' language mandated by our precedents and by the ordinary meaning of the
phrase does not render the phrase meaningless in the statutory definition.").
123. Id.
124. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 709.
127. Id. at 713 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 11, Ky. River, 532 U.S. 706 (No. 99-
1815)).
128. Id. at 713-14.
129. Id. at 714.
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ence," the Court warned that adopting the Board's rule would have
the effect of eliminating the supervisory exception altogether. 30
The Court also criticized how the Board applied the "indepen-
dent judgment" requirement to the "responsibly to direct" clause dif-
ferently than it did to the other eleven enumerated supervisory
functions.13 1 The Board's placement of professional and technical
judgment outside the statutory supervisor category occurred only
where it applied "in directing less-skilled employees to deliver ser-
vices."'132 The Court found "no apparent textual justification for this
asymmetrical limitation" and required the Board to apply the "inde-
pendent judgment" requirement in the same manner to all twelve
listed supervisory functions. 133
Despite its critique of the Board's statutory interpretation, the
Court affirmed the soundness of its underlying labor policy.' 3 4 Be-
cause "[p] rofessional employees by definition engage in work 'involv-
ing the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment,"' a definition
of supervisor that turns on such judgment will frustrate Congress's in-
tent to cover professional employees under the Act.' 35 The Court's
problem lay not with the Board's policy of "preserving the inclusion of
'professional employees' within the coverage of the Act," but with its
failure to reconcile that policy with the statutory text.1 36 The Court
also provided the Board with a possible way out of its quandary-the
Board could limit the supervisory exclusion for responsible direction
by "distinguishing employees who direct the manner of others' per-
formance of discrete tasks from employees who direct other employ-
ees."' 13 7 Regardless, the Kentucky River decision forced the Board to
revisit, and ultimately reshape, its interpretation of the supervisory
exemption.
H. The NLRB Goes Back to the Drawing Board: Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc.
On September 29, 2006, the Board issued three decisions which
laid out its new guidelines for determining supervisory status under
130. Id. at 715.
131. Id. at 715-16.
132. Id. at 715.
133. Id. at 716.
134. Id. at 719-20.
135. Id. at 720 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12) (a) (ii) (2000)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the Act, taking into account the Court's instructions from Kentucky
River.138 The leading case of the three, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., held
that a group of charge nurses at an acute care hospital were excluded
supervisors under section 2(11) of the Act. 139 In a decision that broke
down squarely along party lines, the deeply divided Board found that
the nurses exercised supervisory authority in assigning patients to
other nursing personnel. 140
A. The Majority Opinion
The Oakwood majority established new interpretations of the stat-
utory terms "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judg-
ment," that amount to a major expansion of the Act's supervisory
exclusion. 141 While the Oakwood majority claimed that its opinion
merely adhered to the dictates of Kentucky River, the real-world conse-
quence of the decision will likely be to strip potentially millions of
workers with minor supervisory duties of their right to organize and
bargain collectively. 142 As the dissent presciently pointed out, the deci-
sion "threatens to create a new class of workers under Federal labor
law: workers who have neither the genuine prerogatives of manage-
ment, nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees."1 4 3 Such a large-
scale loss of collective bargaining rights is likely to drastically alter the
fragile balance between labor and management interests that Con-
gress achieved through the Act.
1. Assign
In order to qualify as a supervisor under section 2(11) of the Act,
the worker must perform one of twelve enumerated supervisory func-
tions.144 One of those functions is to "assign ... other employees."' 45
In interpreting the statutory meaning of "assign," the Oakwood major-
ity began with the dictionary definition of the word: "to appoint to a
138. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448 (Sept. 29,
2006); Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 445 (Sept.
29, 2006); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 444 (Sept. 29, 2006).
139. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *4. The basic facts of the Oakwood case are
explained in the introductory section of this Note.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *14.
142. See EISENBREY & MISHEL, supra note 16.
143. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *70 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part in the result).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000); see infra note 188 and accompanying text (listing the
twelve supervisory functions).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
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post or duty."'146 The opinion went on to define the term as "the act of
designating an employee to a place (such as a location, department or
wing), appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or overtime
period), or giving significant overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an em-
ployee."147 The ability to affect the place, time, or work of other work-
ers is supervisory, the majority reasoned, because those factors
constitute terms and conditions of employment.148 Further, the ma-
jority explicitly included "the charge nurses' responsibility to assign
nurses and aides to particular patients" within its definition of
"assign."14 9
The majority opinion found that "the charge nurses' assignment
of patients to other staff and assignment of nurses to specific geo-
graphic locations within the emergency room fall within [the major-
ity's] definition of 'assign' for purposes of Section 2(11)."150 These
assignments of staff to particular patients or places "determine what
will be the required work for an employee during the shift, thereby
having a material effect on the employee's terms and conditions of
employment.''15 Because the charge nurses used "independent judg-
ment" in making these assignments, as discussed in greater detail be-
low, the majority concluded that they were supervisors and excluded
them from coverage under the Act. 152
2. Responsibly to Direct
Another enumerated supervisory function that can qualify a
worker for supervisory status is "responsibly to direct" other employ-
ees.153 The Oakwood majority derived its definition of "responsibly to
direct" largely from a narrow reading of the legislative history of the
Act.' 54 In the words of Senator Flanders, who introduced the amend-
ment to add the term as one of the enumerated supervisory functions
in section 2(11), a worker responsibly directs when there are "men
146. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *17 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTiONARY 132 (1981)).
147. Id. at *18.
148. Id.
149. Id. The majority was careful to distinguish "the charge nurse's designation of sig-
nificant overall duties to an employee" from "the charge nurse's ad hoc instruction that
the employee perform a discrete task," the latter of which would not fall within the defini-
tion of "assign." Id. at *19.
150. Id. at *49.
151. Id. at *49-50.
152. Id. at *51.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
154. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *26.
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under him" and "[h] e determines under general orders whatjob shall
be undertaken next and who shall do it."1 55 The majority, however,
openly acknowledged that Senator Flanders did not intend the phrase
to include "minor supervisory functions performed by lead employees,
straw bosses, and set-up men."156
The majority also required that to qualify as a supervisory func-
tion, direction of other employees must be "responsible" and "carried
out with independent judgment." 1 5 7 The majority identified "respon-
sibly" with accountability, requiring that "the person directing and
performing the oversight of the employee must be accountable for
the performance of the task by the other, such that some adverse con-
sequence may befall the one providing the oversight if the tasks per-
formed by the employee are not performed properly." 158
The Board decided that the charge nurses did not "responsibly
direct the nursing staff within the meaning of Section 2(11)."159 Al-
though the nurses were able to delegate their job duties to other em-
ployees working the same shift, the employer could not show that it
held the nurses accountable for the performance of those duties when
performed by other employees. 160 Additionally, the nurses did not
have authority to correct any errors made by those employees. 61
Therefore, the nurses did not meet the accountability standard for the
"responsible" aspect of responsible direction.1 62
Even though the majority found that the charge nurses did not
responsibly direct other employees, the charge nurses were still ex-
cluded as supervisors because they "assigned" tasks to their coworkers.
A worker only needs to perform one of the twelve enumerated supervi-
sory functions to fall within the supervisory exclusion.1 63
Although the majority's definition of "responsibly to direct" did
not encompass the charge nurses in this case, there is a significant
danger that the majority's interpretation of the term could exclude
employees with only minor supervisory duties in future cases. Unlike
155. Id. at *27 n.27
156. Id. at *26.
157. Id. at *27.
158. Id. at *31.
159. Id. at *47.
160. Id. at *47-48. The employer carries the burden of proof when seeking to exclude
workers as supervisors. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711-12 (2001).
161. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *47.
162. Id.
163. The list of supervisory functions in the statute is disjunctive, therefore a worker
who fulfills only one of the functions falls within the supervisory exemption. See 129 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (2000).
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the dissent, which requires that the worker responsibly directs an en-
tire work unit, the majority definition encompasses workers who
merely responsibly direct one other employee. As the dissent ex-
plained, this broad definition contradicts Senator Flanders's intent of
excluding only workers with supervisory duties on par with those of
foremen.164
3. Independent Judgment
In order to qualify as a supervisor under section 2(11), the
worker must perform one of the enumerated supervisory functions
while using "independent judgment."'165 In construing an interpreta-
tion of the statutory definition of "independentjudgment" that hewed
to the mandates of Kentucky River, the Oakwood majority again began
its analysis by turning to the dictionary definitions of the term at is-
sue. 166 Utilizing "the ordinary meaning of the term" that it garnered
from Webster's Dictionary, the majority set out that "to exercise 'inde-
pendent judgment' an individual must at minimum act, or effectively
recommend action, free of the control of others and form an opinion
or evaluation by discerning and comparing data."' 67
After relying on the dictionary to establish a baseline definition of
"independentjudgment," the majority went on to "consider the Act as
a whole, its legislative history, policy considerations, and judicial pre-
cedent" in order to further define the term.' 68 First, the majority
stated that it must "interpret 'independent judgment' in light of the
contrasting statutory language, 'not of a merely routine or clerical
nature.' "169
Second, the majority cited Kentucky River in declaring that it
"must assess the degree of discretion exercised by the putative supervi-
sor" when analyzing "independent judgment" under the Act. 70 In fol-
lowing what it viewed as the Court's mandate, the majority found "that
a judgment is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by de-
164. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *100-04 (Members Liebman & Walsh,
dissenting).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
166. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *36 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1148, 1223 (1981)). Webster's defines "independent" as "not subject to
control by others" and 'judgment" as "the action of judging; the mental or intellectual
process of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *36-37.
170. Id. at *37-38 (citing NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713-14
(2001)).
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tailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or rules, the
verbal instructions of a higher authority, or in the provisions of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement.' 71
The majority stated that some of the charge nurses exercised "in-
dependent judgment" in assigning staff to particular patients, and
therefore fell within the statutory definition of supervisor.172 Because
of the variety of staff available for each shift, 7 3 the charge nurse had
to exercise meaningful discretion in matching the skills of a particular
nurse to the "condition and needs of a particular patient."1 74 The ma-
jority found the degree of discretion required to make these kinds of
staffing decisions greater than that "exercised by most leadmen" and
therefore sufficient to exclude the charge nurses from the Act's
protection.175
B. The Oakwood Dissent: A Better Reflection of Congressional
Intent and the Underlying Policies of the Act
The two Clinton-appointed members of the Board issued a scath-
ing dissent to the majority's expansive interpretation of section 2(11)
supervisory status. 176 The dissent criticized the majority opinion as
contrary to Congress's express intent to cover professional employees
under the Act.' 77 With professionals comprising a rapidly growing
171. Id. at *38 (citing Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 1998);
NLRB v. Meenan Oil Co., 139 F.3d 311, 321 (2d Cir. 1998); Dynamic Sci., Inc., 334
N.L.R.B. 391, 391 (2001)).
172. Id. at *50-51. The majority distinguished the role of emergency room charge
nurses from that of the other charge nurses. "[T] he emergency room charge nurses do not
take into account patient acuity or nursing skill in making patient care assignments.
Whereas the record contains evidence of situations in other units in which the charge
nurses must assess individual professional or personal attributes of the nursing staff, there
is no similar evidence for the charge nurses in the emergency room." Id. at *63. For that
reason, the majority included the emergency room charge nurses in the bargaining unit.
Id. at *64.
173. "In addition to the charge nurse, there are two to six RNs on each shift, depend-
ing on the time of day and the unit, and many of the units also have licensed practical
nurses or other licensed staff working on each shift." Id. at *50.
174. Id. at *50-51.
175. Id. at *51.
176. Id. at *70-146 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part and concurring in
part in the result). President Clinton first appointed Member Liebman to the Board, and
the Senate confirmed her for a five-year term that expired on December 16, 2002. Presi-
dent Bush reappointed her, and she is now serving her third term. President Clinton ap-
pointed Member Walsh to a term that ended on December 20, 2001. President Bush
reappointed him, and he is now serving his third term. NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/About
_Us/Overview/board (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
177. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *70-71.
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proportion of the nation's workforce,178 the majority failed to ade-
quately consider the "real world consequences" of its broad interpre-
tation of the supervisory exclusion. 179 Because "most professionals
have some supervisory responsibilities in the sense of directing an-
other's work," the dissent called for "significantly narrower interpreta-
tions of the ambiguous statutory terms 'assign .. .other employees'
and 'responsibly to direct them' than the majority adopts.' 180
The dissent assailed the majority for relying on dictionary defini-
tions to interpret ambiguous statutory language. Quoting the Su-
preme Court, the dissent pointed out that:
[IT] he definition of words in isolation.. . is not necessarily control-
ling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not
extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpreta-
tion of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory
text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and con-
sulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis. 181
Contrary to the statutory interpretation that the majority gleaned
largely from the dictionary, the statutory text as a whole, the context
and purpose of the Act, and the legislative history all point to a more
constricted definition of supervisor. 182
According to the legislative history, Congress "exercised great
care, desiring that the employees ... excluded from the coverage of
the [A]ct be truly supervisory. 1 83 The majority neglected to suffi-
ciently take into account Congress's distinction between "minor su-
pervisory employees" and "the supervisor vested with such genuine
management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or
make effective recommendations with respect to such action."' 84 The
dissent offered its own interpretations of "assign," "responsibly to di-
rect," and "independent judgment" that were consistent with the stat-
utory text and Supreme Court precedent, while better reflecting
Congress's intent and serving the "policy interests underlying the
Act." 18 5
178. Id. at *70. According to the dissent, professionals may number thirty-four million
and make up 23.3% of the workforce by 2012. Id.
179. Id. at *71 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting).
180. Id. at *70-71.
181. Id. at *74 (quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Ser., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at *80 (quoting S. REP. No. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 425 (1985)).
184. Id. at *79 (quoting S. REP. No. 80-105, at 4-5 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 410-11 (1985)).
185. Id. at *81.
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1. Assign
In contrast to the majority, the dissent "would limit the phrase
'assign employees' to a significant employment decision on the order
of determining (1) an employee's position with the employer (in most
settings, identified by job classification); (2) designated work site (i.e.,
facility or departmental unit), or (3) work hours (i.e., shift)."186 The
dissent would allow the term to encompass only assignment of em-
ployees themselves and would not allow it to extend to assignment of
tasks, as did the majority.' 87
When viewed alongside the other eleven supervisory functions in
section 2(11), 188 all of which "speak either to altering employment
tenure itself... or to actions that affect an employee's overall status or
situation," it becomes clear that "'assign' must denote authority to de-
termine the basic terms and conditions of an employee's job, i.e., posi-
tion, work site, or work hours." 189 The mere act of assigning tasks does
not affect the basic terms and conditions of employment, especially
when those tasks already fall within the employee's job duties. 190
Turning to the real-world consequences of the majority's opin-
ion, the dissent pointed out that "the majority's interpretation of 'as-
sign' as encompassing the daily assignment or distribution of tasks
(or, in the healthcare context, patients) threatens to sweep almost all
staff nurses outside of the Act's protection."19 This result is likely be-
cause "most nurses-as well as other professionals who work with as-
sistants or as team leaders-routinely play a role in assigning out the
day's work."192 The scale of such a broad exclusion of nurses would
likely be massive-the Department of Labor counted 2.4 million RNs
186. Id. at *85-86.
187. Id. at *86.
188. Those enumerated functions are "to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, ... reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances." 29 U.S.C. §152(11) (2000).
189. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *88-89 (Members Liebman & Walsh,
dissenting).
190. Id. at *89. The majority only required that the supervisory functions affect a term
or condition of employment, i.e., place, time, or overall tasks. Id. at *18 (majority). This is
a much lower bar than the dissent's requirement that the function affect the "basic terms
and conditions of an employee's job, i.e., position, work site, or work hours." Id. at *88-89
(Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting). The dissent explained that its more rigorous
standard was "consistent with the Board's traditional approach in defining supervisors,
which the Taft-Hartley Congress endorsed." Id. at *88.
191. Id. at *94.
192. Id.
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and 720,000 LPNs in 200619 3-and clearly contradicts Congress's pur-
pose in expressly including professionals in section 2(12) of the
Act. 1 9 4
The dissent would have held that the charge nurses did not "as-
sign" under the Act, because they "have no authority to determine an
employee's job classification, designated nursing unit, or work
shift. '1 9 5 The work distributed by the charge nurses to other staff all
fell within their predetermined job duties, and it therefore did not
rise to the level of a supervisory function.1 9 6
2. Responsibly to Direct
The dissent took issue with the majority's interpretation of
"responsibly to direct" and advocated alternatively for the Board Gen-
eral Counsel's proposed definition of the term:
An individual responsibly directs with independent judgment
within the meaning of Section 2(11) when it is established that the
individual: a. has been delegated substantial authority to ensure
that a work unit achieves management's objectives and is thus "in
charge"; b. is held accountable for the work of others; and c. exer-
cises significant discretion and judgment in directing his or her
work unit.19 7
The critical difference between the dissent's test and the major-
ity's test is that the dissent's test requires "oversight with respect to a
work unit" while the majority's test does not.19 8 Senator Flanders, who
introduced the statutory phrase "responsibly to direct" on the floor of
the Senate, directly alluded to the importance of authority over an
entire work unit rather than over mere individual employees. 199 In
describing the type of worker he intended to exclude with the phrase,
Senator Flanders stated that "[h] e is charged with the responsible di-
rection of his department and the men under him."20 0
193. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Employment and
Wages, Registered Nurses (May 2006), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes291111.htm;
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Employment and Wages,
Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses (May 2006), http://www.bis.gov/oes/
current/oes292061.htm.
194. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *95 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissenting).
195. Id. at *113.
196. Id.
197. Id. at *101-02.
198. Id. at *102.
199. Id. at *98-99.
200. Id. (quoting S. REP No. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGIstATivE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 1303 (1985)).
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The majority's interpretation of "responsibly to direct," which
only requires that the first two prongs of the General Counsel's pro-
posed definition are met, but not authority over an entire work unit,
will exclude many employees with only "minor supervisory" duties.
20 1
Under the majority's definition, an employer may exclude an em-
ployee from statutory coverage by simply giving that employee author-
ity to instruct co-workers to perform particular tasks, allowing the
employee to exercise independent judgment in relation to his or her
instruction, and then holding the employee accountable for his or her
co-workers' performance. 20 2 The majority's definition gives no rele-
vance to how minor the assigned tasks may be.2
0 3
Although the dissent provided a narrower definition of "respon-
sibly to direct" than the majority by requiring the direction to be over
a work unit rather than merely over another employee, the dissent's
definition remains within the confines of the Court's interpretation of
the supervisory exclusion in Kentucky River.20 4 In fact, the definition of
"responsibly to direct" was not at issue in that case, and the Court only
commented on it in dicta. 20 5 The Court merely pointed to a possible
way that the Board could narrow the supervisory exclusion by requir-
ing responsible direction to be of other employees and not merely of
"the manner of others' performance of discrete tasks."2
0 6
The Oakwood majority and dissent both took the Court's advice,
requiring that responsible direction be of other employees and not
merely of tasks. The dissent's definition, however, which required that
the direction be not only of other employees but of an entire work
unit, better reflected the congressional intent to exclude only workers
with substantial supervisory authority.20 7
The charge nurses in Oakwood did not have oversight over work
units: "[T] hey do not decide staffing, scheduling or budgets that de-
201. Id. at *107.
202. Id.
203. Id. In one of the other decisions issued on the same day as Oakwood, the Board
found that nurses who instruct assistants "to clip residents' toenails and fingernails, to
empty catheters, or to change an incontinent resident" qualify as statutory supervisors as
long as the instruction is responsible and entails "independent judgment." Golden Crest
Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 445, *20 (Sept. 29, 2006).
204. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 720 (2001) ("Perhaps the Board
could offer a limiting interpretation of the supervisory function of responsible direction by
distinguishing employees who direct the manner of others' performance of discrete tasks
from employees who direct other employees, as § 152(11) requires.").
205. Id. at 720-21.
206. Id. at 720.
207. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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termine the overall direction and functioning of the unit. They are
not held accountable for the overall performance of their unit."20 8
Under the dissent's definition, the nurses do not exercise the author-
ity to responsibly direct and cannot be classified as statutory supervi-
sors on that basis. 209
3. Independent Judgment
The dissent, for the most part, accepted the majority's two-prong
test for "independent judgment": (1) "to exercise 'independent judg-
ment' an individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend
action, free of the control of others and form an opinion or evalua-
tion by discerning and comparing data"; and (2) "the individual's ac-
tion or effective recommendation must not be 'of a merely routine or
clerical nature."' 210 The dissent went on, however, to admonish that
locating the threshold of discretion necessary to constitute "indepen-
dent judgment" must "be guided not by the dictionary or abstract con-
siderations, but by practical realities viewed in light of the
Congressional intent to exclude foremen and their equivalent, but
not minor supervisory employees, from the Act."211
Both the dissent and the majority definitions of "independent
judgment" followed Kentucky River's mandate that the term refer only
to a degree, and not a type, of judgment, and that the term apply
equally to all twelve enumerated supervisory functions. 21 2 The dissent
made clear, however, that the determination of the degree of judg-
ment necessary to constitute supervisory status should be based on the
realities of each particular workplace and not on acontextual
formulas. 21-3
208. Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *114-15 (Members Liebman & Walsh,
dissenting).
209. Id. at *115.
210. Id. at *108 (quoting the words of the Act).
211. Id. at *110.
212. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 714-15 (2001).
213. See Oakwood, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *71 (Members Liebman & Walsh, dissent-
ing) ("[T]he reasonableness of the majority's interpretation can surely be tested by its real-
world consequences.").
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Il. Why the Dissent Got it Right: Expansion of the Act's
Supervisory Exclusion Is Out of Line with
Congressional Intent and Underlying National
Labor Policy
As the Oakwood dissent trenchantly stated, the majority's interpre-
tation of section 2(11) will potentially exclude many professional
workers, who Congress expressly covered in section 2(12), from the
Act's protection.21 4 Not only does the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley amendments strongly indicate that Congress did not intend to
exclude workers with only minor supervisory duties, but the text and
legislative history of the Wagner Act itself also militate against an ex-
pansive view of the supervisory exclusion. Despite this strong evidence
of congressional intent, and without consideration of the national la-
bor policy of encouraging collective bargaining, the Oakwood majority
adopted an interpretation of section 2(11) that largely engulfs the
Act's express inclusion of professional employees.
The Wagner Act declares that it is the "policy of the United States
to . . .encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing and .. .protect[ ] the exercise by workers of full freedom of asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing."215 Although Congress amended the Act in 1947 to ex-
clude workers with true supervisory authority, Congress left in place
the national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining that it
so forcefully enunciated in the Wagner Act.2 16
Far from encouraging collective bargaining and protecting the
statutory right of workers to unionize, the Oakwood decision may en-
courage employers to rearrange job duties to maximize statutory ex-
emptions. By merely giving more workers some independent authority
to distribute tasks or assignments to other employees, employers can
seriously dilute the bargaining strength of unions in their workplaces.
Allowing employers to shuffle job duties in order to exempt their em-
ployees from the Act's protection gives an unfair advantage to busi-
nesses who seek to avoid unionization.
A. Collective Bargaining to Achieve Industrial Peace
The Oakwood decision undermines the Act's underlying purpose
of creating "industrial peace" and avoiding strikes that harm the na-
214. Id. at *70.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
216. See id.
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tional economy.2 1 7 The Wagner Act clearly states Congress's intent to
"promote[ ] the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices funda-
mental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes."2 1 8 By offer-
ing government protection and regulation of organizing and
collective bargaining, the Act provides strong incentive to workers to
settle their grievances through administrative processes rather than
through militant action.
Contrary to this goal, taking away the statutory right to unionize
and resolve grievances 'through the process of collective bargaining is
likely to lead to greater industrial unrest and more strikes. As Profes-
sor Marley Weiss noted, "[d] epriving [workers] of the right to organ-
ize does not guarantee their loyalty, and it does not prevent them
from taking collective action-it merely moves the activity outside the
regulation of the NLRA." 2 19 By removing the primary mechanism
through which workers and employers can resolve their grievances
peacefully, excluding broad groups of workers from coverage under
the Act invites the kind of industrial unrest that Congress sought to
alleviate through the Act.
The Oakwood decision also runs counter to the industrial peace
goal behind the Health Care Amendments Act of 1974: stabilizing la-
bor relations in the health-care industry in order to improve patient
care.220 Stripping health-care workers of the Act's protection may lead
to a return to the abysmal pre-1974 labor relations environment in the
health-care industry. Consequently, this is likely to cause more disrup-
tions in care due to recognitional strikes.22 1 As the Board makes it
more difficult for health-care workers to improve their wages and
working conditions through the administrative processes provided by
the Act, workers in that industry become more likely to turn to in-
creasingly militant methods of achieving their goals. Even before the
Board announced its decision, over 30,000 RNs signed pledges with
their union to strike if their employers attempt to "exploit" the Oak-
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Weiss, supra note 66, at 397.
220. See supra Part I.D (discussing Congress's reasons for restoring statutory coverage
under the Act to private-sector health-care employees in the Health Care Amendments of
1974).
221. Weiss, supra note 66, at 397.
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wood rules. 222 Additionally, hundreds of RNs protested the forthcom-
ing decision by stopping midday traffic in front of the national
headquarters of the American Hospital Association in downtown Chi-
cago. 2 23 These demonstrations show that nurses understand how rela-
tively subtle changes in the Board's interpretation of statutory
language can impact their day-to-day lives, and that they are willing to
disrupt their employers' businesses when pushed.
And it is not only nurses who are closely monitoring the Board's
actions. On October 13, 2006, hundreds of union members represent-
ing a broad spectrum of industries rallied in front of the Board's
Nashville, Tennessee offices to protest the Oakwood decision.2 24 Rallies
such as this one indicate that workers are willing to act outside of the
Board's processes when the Board itself threatens to push them
outside of the protection of the Act.
B. Worker Empowerment and Rights of Belonging
The Oakwood decision also undermines the goal of many of the
proponents of the original Wagner Act to encourage fuller participa-
tion of workers in a democratic society. For the New Deal Members of
Congress responsible for passing the Act, whose views were rooted in
"labor's constitution of freedom,"225 unionization was a vehicle
through which workers could act collectively not only to positively im-
pact their employment relationship, but also to act more effectively in
the political realm to influence public policy generally.2 26
Broadly speaking, the rights of free association and collective ac-
tion guaranteed by the Wagner Act fall into the category identified by
Rebecca Zietlow and Denise Morgan as "rights of belonging. '227
Zietlow defines "rights of belonging" as "those rights that promote an
inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community of the
United States and that facilitate equal membership in that commu-
222. Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass'n, Nurses Denounce Bush Labor Board Ruling on
Union Rights as Fundamental Assault on Democracy, Patient Safety-RNs Prepared to
Strike to Defend Their Rights (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
223. Frank Borgers, RNs Confront Hospital Industry on Supervisor Issue in Chicago, REciS-
TERED NURSE, Aug. 2006, at 4.
224. James Parks, Working Families Rally in Tennessee: Labor Board Decision 'Pure Politics',
AFL-CIO WEBLOG, Oct. 13, 2006, http://blog.aflcio.org/2006/10/13/working-families-
rally-in-tennessee-labor-board-decision-%e2%80%98pure-politics%e2 %80%99/.
225. See ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 75.
226. See id. at 76-79.
227. Id. at 6, 64; Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress
and Rights of Belonging, 73 CIN. L. Rrv. 1347 (2005).
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nity."228 According to Zietlow, "[t]he right to organize into a union
and bargain collectively is arguably the quintessential right of belong-
ing because it facilitates the formation of communities of workers who
benefit both economically and socially."229
The ideals of industrial democracy inherent in the union election
and collective bargaining processes can also transfer to participation
in the larger society. Workers who participate in a democratic process
to choose representatives to advocate for their interests in the work-
place are more likely to engage in the process of choosing representa-
tives in a democratic government.230 Senator Wagner himself echoed
this sentiment when he stated, "let men know the dignity of freedom
and self-expression in their daily lives, and they will never bow to tyr-
anny in any quarter of their national life. ' 23i
Although the Board's interpretation of the Act's supervisory ex-
emption may be one fair reading of the text of section 2(11) and Su-
preme Court precedent, the Oakwood decision contravenes the spirit
of inclusion and democratic principles that are at the heart of the
Wagner Act. A recent report estimated that the Board's ruling could
result in up to eight million workers losing their statutory right to
unionize and bargain collectively with their employers. 232 Such a dras-
tic reduction in potential bargaining power will not only render un-
ions substantially less effective in advocating for their members in the
workplace, but also less able to exert political strength to effectuate
public policies that benefit workers across the board.
Workers excluded from the Act do not have statutory protection
when they "engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of col-
228. ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 6.
229. Id. at 64.
230.
It is not a surprise that citizens who spend eight or more hours a day obeying
orders with no rights, legal or otherwise, to participate in crucial decisions that
affect them, do not engage in robust, critical dialogue about the structure of our
society. Eventually, the strain of being deferential servants from nine to five di-
minishes our after-hours liberty and sense of civic entitlement and responsibility.
ELAINE BERNARD, YOUNG DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS, WHY UNIONS MATTER, available at http://
www.ydsusa.org/statements/why-unions-matter.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).
231. Interview with Senator Wagner, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 1937, at 23, cited in HARRY A.
MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NA-
TIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 7 (1950). In the same interview, Senator Wag-
ner presciently stated, "Let men become the servile pawns of their masters in the factories
of the land and there will be destroyed the bone and sinew of resistance to political dicta-
torship. Fascism begins in industry, not in government." Id.
232. EISENBREY & MISHEL, supra note 16, at 2.
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lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" 233 and therefore
must risk their jobs when they form communities of common interest
with other workers. Because the Board excluded the twelve Oakwood
charge nurses as supervisors, their employer may legally terminate
them if they attempt to form a union or ask for improvements in
wages, hours, or working conditions. The Oakwood decision delivered
a significant blow to Senator Wagner's vision of giving workers a
greater voice in society.
On the other hand, the Oakwood dissenters demonstrated how
the Board could have stayed true to both the industrial peace and
worker empowerment goals of the Wagner Act, while effectuating the
statutory language of the Act and the Supreme Court's interpretations
of that language. The dissent succeeded in adhering to Kentucky
River's instructions regarding the statutory terms "independent judg-
ment" and "responsibly to direct," while providing a narrowing inter-
pretation of these terms that adequately considered the structure of
the Act as a whole, its legislative history, and the national labor policy
and underlying goals of the Wagner Act. Given the increasing
politicization of the Board, 234 however, it came as a surprise to no one
that the Bush-appointed majority instead chose to roll back labor pro-
tections for possibly millions of workers.
IV. The Oakwood Decision Reflects and Results From the
Board's Increasing Alienation From Shop-Floor
Realities and Political Polarization
The Oakwood decision is only the latest in a string of decisions
that have excluded increasing numbers of workers from coverage
under the Act 23 5 and restricted the scope of protected activities under
the Act.236 Other recent Board decisions have greatly increased the
233. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
234. See infra Part IV.
235. See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 42 (2004) (barring graduate student teaching
assistants from coverage under the Act); Brevard Achievement Carr, 342 N.L.R.B. 101
(2004) (barring disabled workers employed as janitors from coverage under the Act); Pa.
Acad. of the Fine Arts, 343 N.L.R.B. 93 (2004) (barring artists' models from coverage
under the Act).
236. See, e.g., Waters of Orchard Park, 341 N.L.R.B. 93 (2004) (holding that nursing
home employees fired for calling state patient care hotline to report excessive heat not
engaged in protected activity); Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 45 (2004) (holding that
employee who solicited coworker to testify before state agency to support her sexual harass-
ment claim not engaged in protected activity); IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 148 (2004) (hold-
ing that non-union employees do not have fight to accompaniment of coworker when
participating in meeting with employer that may result in discipline or termination).
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ability of employers to intimidate and threaten employees who seek to
unionize.23 7 These decisions collectively demonstrate the hostility of
the current Board's Bush-appointed majority towards the national la-
bor policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and ... protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing."238 Rather than effectuating Congress's mandate
to protect and encourage collective bargaining, the Board has in these
cases acted as an impediment to that goal.
The Oakwood majority's unwillingness to consider the underlying
purposes of the Act and the real-world consequences of its decision is
evidence of what James J. Brudney refers to as the Board's increasing
isolation and politicization. 239 All administrative agencies must adapt
to changing circumstances while remaining within the confines of the
statutory schemes they are charged with implementing.240 The
Board's recent rulings, however, have largely ignored the rapidly
changing nature of the workplace and the everyday reality of Ameri-
can workers. Rather than effectively adapting to the changing labor
relations environment, the Board's isolation and politicization have
contributed to the Act's "diminished relevance or applicability to the
modern American workplace." 241
The Board's isolation has rendered it less effective when attempt-
ing to vindicate the organizing and collective bargaining rights of
workers. 242 While the conservative ideological bent of many Supreme
Court justices has certainly played a role in the Court's rejection of
several recent Board efforts to protect workers, "the Board's isolated
237. See, e.g., Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 41 (2005) (holding that managers
who listened in on conversations among off-duty employees about unionization and then
interrupted to offer the employer's anti-union stance did not commit an unfair labor prac-
tice); Crown Bolt, Inc. 343 N.L.R.B. 86 (2004) (holding that an employer's threats to close
its facility if union won representation election are not presumed to be disseminated
throughout the bargaining unit).
238. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
239. James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'VJ. 221, 223 (2005). Brudney attributes the Board's isolation to several key
factors: congressional inaction in the area of labor relations, the Act's restrictive right of
access to federal courts, the Board's reliance on adjudication rather than rulemaking to set
policy, and the Board's refusal to acquiesce to applicable appellate court precedent. See
supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the limited access to federal courts under
the Act).
240. Brudney, supra note 239, at 223-24.
241. Id. at 224.
242. Id. at 241-42.
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status and less than transparent decision-making approach appear to
have contributed to its lack of success." 243
The current Board's failure to protect the interests of workers
also results from the politicization of the selection of its members. 244
Although the framers of both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts envi-
sioned a nonpartisan and impartial Board, a trend of appointing indi-
viduals with extensive management backgrounds began to emerge
during the Eisenhower administration. 245 While early Republican ap-
pointees to the Board demonstrated a basic level of recognition and
respect for the advantages of collective bargaining, President Reagan
appointed members with a staunchly anti-union outlook.246 This ideo-
logical shift in the Board's composition prompted union leaders to
forcefully advocate for the selection of pro-union members to the
Board.247
During the recent period of Republican dominance of national
politics, the political polarization of the Board has amplified. 248 The
magnified influence of avowedly conservative interest groups, like the
National Right to Work Committee, in the selection of Board mem-
bers has created an atmosphere in which organized labor has lost faith
in the ability of the Board to protect or vindicate statutory rights. 249
Rather than turning to the Board's procedural assistance in organiz-
ing and bargaining,250 now unions increasingly rely on non-Board
mechanisms such as card-check neutrality agreements. 25'
243. Id. at 242.
244. Id. at 243.
245. Id. at 243-45.
246. Id. at 248 (citing Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transforma-
tion of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1384-85 (2000) (describing strong anti-
union backgrounds of nominees Van de Water, Dotson, and Hunter)).
247. Id. at 249 (quoting AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, who stated, "For the first
time, appointments to the NLRB have been of a character that represents the perversion of
that board into an instrument of anti-union employers," warning that labor would from
that point forward seek the appointment of union partisans to the Board).
248. Id. at 251.
249. Id.
250. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Board's administrative procedures relating to
union recognition through a secret ballot election).
251. Brudney, supra note 239, at 251 (citing a study reporting that of 64,000 workers in
one leading union's newly-organized bargaining units, less than 15,000 came through
Board elections). The Board has recently indicated a willingness to revisit its long-time
acceptance of the validity of card-check recognition. Id. at 222. Neutrality agreements gen-
erally state that the employer will not interfere with or communicate opposition to a
union's campaign to organize its workforce. David Sherwyn & Zev Eigen, Card-Checks and
Neutrality Agreements: How Hotel Unions Staged a Comeback in 2006, CORNELL HOSPITALITY
REP., Apr. 2007, at 10 & n.22. "Card check" provisions "require[ ] the employer to recog-
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The Board's increased isolation and politicization underlies and
explains its decision in Oakwood. The Board's isolation from the legis-
lative branch in particular has caused a disconnect between the text of
the Act and the Board's ability to interpret that text in a manner that
reflects the realities of the contemporary workplace. 252 According to
Brudney, "agencies renew their vitality and contribute to the develop-
ment of national policy ... by being forced to respond to directives
from Congress."253 Congress, however, has not passed major legisla-
tion in the area of labor relations since the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments of 1959.254 And more importantly to the case at hand, Congress
has not revisited its statutory definitions of "supervisor" or "profes-
sional employee" since the 1947 Taft-Hartiey Act.2 55
The composition of the workforce and the labor relations envi-
ronment have changed dramatically since Congress last amended the
Act. By 2012, professionals may account for more than twenty-three
percent of the United States workforce, 256 a phenomenon that Con-
gress may not have foreseen when it defined "professional employee"
in 1947. Because " [m]ost professionals have some supervisory respon-
sibilities in the sense of directing another's work,"257 Congress also
may not have realized the extent to which its supervisory exclusion
would impinge on its express coverage of professional employees.
While the Board has attempted with mixed success to give effect to the
statutory language under rapidly changing circumstances, it has not
received guidance from Congress in fifty years as to how best to go
about that task.
nize the union if a majority of the bargaining-unit employees sign authorization cards,"
therefore bypassing the need for a Board election. Id. at 11. A union's chance of gaining
recognition under a card-check neutrality agreement (78.2%) is more than thirty percent
greater than in a traditional Board election (46%). Id.
252. Brudney, supra note 239, at 227-29.
253. Id. at 227.
254. Id. at 228; see also Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000)). On
March 1, 2007, the House of Representatives passed the Employee Free Choice Act, which
would remove some of the obstacles that workers face when they attempt to organize into
unions. Steven Greenhouse, House Passes Top Priority of Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at
A-14. This indicates that the current Democratic Congress may pass major labor law reform
legislation.
255. See Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-166).
256. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL PROJECTIONS
AND TRAINING DATA (Table II1-1) 72 (2006-07), available at http://www.bls.gov/emp/
optd/optdtabiil .pdf.
257. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) (opinion by Posner,
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The Oakwood decision illustrates the Board's isolation not only
from the other branches of government, but also from the workers
whom its decisions most directly impact. While the dissent heavily
weighed the severe consequences of the Act on potentially millions of
workers, 25 8 the majority dismissed such concerns as "results-oriented"
decision making and instead relied on acontextual dictionary defini-
tions to shape its interpretations. 2 59 While the dictionary may provide
some insight into the plain meanings of statutory terms, context is
critically important in defining the contours of the employment rela-
tionship-the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the validity of
the "common law of the shop" in adjudicating labor disputes.260
The Board's consistent refusal to hear oral arguments, despite re-
peated requests from labor organizations and legal scholars to allow
them, is another clear indication of the Board's willful alienation from
the concerns of workers. 26 1 Not only did the Board deny oral argu-
ment in Oakwood, the Board has not heard oral arguments in any case
since the Bush Board took over in 2001.262 This was not always the
Board's practice-" [t] he Board has historically held oral argument in
cases of this degree of importance, including in the two nurse supervi-
sor cases it designated as lead cases .... All prior Boards in the last 25
years have granted oral argument in significant cases."
2 63
Although the Board did invite briefs from interested amici, and
asked amici to address specific questions in their briefs relating to how
the Board should interpret supervisory status, 2 6 4 oral arguments play a
fundamentally different role than briefs in the adjudication process.
258. See EISENBREY & MICHEL, supra note 16, at 2.
259. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, at *69
(Sept. 29, 2006).
260. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
579-80 (1960) ("Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional characteris-
tics and the governmental nature of the collective bargaining process demand a common
law of the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement.").
261. See, e.g., Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Denial of Oral Argument, Oak-
wood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, Case 7-RC-22141
(Aug. 21, 2006); Letter from Thirty Law Professors from Around the Country Urging the
Board to Hear Oral Arguments in Supervisor Cases (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fisk Let-
ter] (calling the cases "among the most important in the 71 years of Board jurisprudence"
because "the determination of employee status is critical to all rights under the NLRA"),
available at http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/upload/fisk-letter.pdf.
262. Fisk Letter, supra note 261.
263. Id.
264. NLRB Notice and Invitation to File Briefs: Oakwood Healathcare, Inc.; Beverly-
Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc; Croft Metals, Inc., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 144, at E-1 (July
28, 2003).
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In its Motion to Reconsider Denial of Oral Argiment in Oakwood, the
AFL-CIO quoted Chief Justice William Rehnquist who wrote, "[0] ral
argument offers an opportunity for a direct exchange of ideas be-
tween court and counsel."265 In oral argument, "[c]ounsel can play a
significant role in responding to the concerns of the judges, concerns
that counsel won't always be able to anticipate in preparing the
briefs."266 The AFL-CIO brief argued, to no avail, that "[i]n cases as
important as these, the Board should seek guidance through all availa-
ble means, including both briefing and oral argument. '267
A letter to the Board from Duke Law School Professor Catherine
Fisk and twenty-nine other law professors reiterated the AFL-CIO's po-
sition, stating that "[w] ritten briefs are no substitute for the searching,
interactive exchange possible in oral argument .... The short addi-
tional delay needed to hold oral argument will be fully justified by
making sure that the Board is in a position to consider all the ramifi-
cations of its decisions."268
Although the Board is not bound to hear oral argument in any
case, its refusal to do so in a case potentially impacting millions of
workers is unjustifiable. Even if oral argument would not have ulti-
mately changed the outcome of Oakwood, it would have at least given
the affected workers an opportunity to voice their concerns and ad-
ded a measure of credibility to the decision. 269 Holding oral argu-
ments allows the Board "to invite participants into the process of how
the Board makes decisions." 270 Given the intent of the congressional
supporters of the Wagner Act to increase the participation of workers
in the larger political forces that shape their lives, the Board's denial
of the affected workers' day in court is particularly egregious.
V. Conclusion: The Way Forward-Congressional Action
The Oakwood decision is a clarion call for Congress to clarify the
ambiguous language in section 2(11) of the Act, as well as to resolve
the seeming cross purposes of the supervisory exclusion in section
265. Motion to Reconsider Denial of Oral Argument, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348
N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 448, Case 7-RC-22141 (July 13, 2006) (quoting William
H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 MERCER L. REv. 1015, 1021 (1984)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Fisk Letter, supra note 261.
269. Oakwood dissenter Dennis Walsh stated that hearing oral argument in the case
would help add to the credibility of the Board. Bush Board, State of Labor Law Debated by
Members, Practitioners, BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAiRs, 180 L.R.R. 28 (2006).
270. Id.
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2(11) and the express coverage of professional employees in 2(12).271
The Supreme Court itself acknowledged the ambiguity of the term
"independent judgment," one of the three basic requirements for the
supervisory exemption.2 72 In many ways, the Court's decision in Ken-
tucky River raised more questions than it answered. The difficulty of
the Board's interpretative task is especially evident in the extensive list
of questions that it put forward in advance of the Oakwood decision
regarding the scope and interrelationships of the various statutory
terms relating to supervisory and professional status.273
Although the legislative history of the Act strongly indicates that
Congress only intended to exclude workers with the power to effect
the terms and conditions of employment of their co-workers, "the stat-
utory language does not lend itself to an easy effectuation of this in-
tent."2 74 Unless Congress amends the Act to better reflect its
underlying purpose, the Board will continue to struggle to carry out
congressional intent within the existing statutory framework.
Congress should act to amend section 2(11) to end the isolation
of the Board in interpreting the Act's supervisory exclusion and to
initiate a broader national dialogue on the role of collective bargain-
ing in the contemporary workplace. Congress occupies a much better
position than either the Board or the courts to carry out extensive
fact-finding as to the realities on the ground for American workers,
and how to adapt the language of the Act to a labor relations environ-
ment vastly different than the one that existed in 1947.
In fact, much of the initial impetus to pass the Wagner Act came
in reaction to the refusal of courts to protect workers' rights in the
early Twentieth Century.2 75 During the Lochner era, the courts struck
down many of the Labor Movement's efforts to enact legislation pro-
tective of workers' interests as interfering with the "right to con-
271. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)-(12) (2000) (defining "supervisor" and "professional em-
ployee" status, respectively).
272. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001) ("[I]t is certainly
true that the statutory term 'independentjudgment' is ambiguous with respect to the degree
of discretion required for supervisory status."). In his separate opinion, justice Stevens
identified the term "responsibly to direct" as equally ambiguous. Id. at 726 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. See Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, supra note 264.
274. Weiss, supra note 66, at 396 (quoting AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel Craig
Becker).
275. See, e.g., ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 83 (citing the Court's overturning of the Na-
tional Industrial Relations Act as unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), as "one of the most important factors in the success of the
Wagner Act").
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tract." 276 Federal courts of that period frequently issued injunctions as
weapons to prevent workers from organizing or engaging in political
action.277 Unions could not look to the judicial system to protect the
rights of workers, so they instead turned to the legislature and worked
towards the passage of anti-injunction legislation. 278
Similarly today, workers and the organizations that represent
them cannot rely on the Board or the Court to protect their interests.
As the Board becomes increasingly mired in its own isolation and po-
litical polarization, workers should turn to their elected representa-
tives in Congress to redefine what it means to be a "supervisor" or a
"professional employee" in today's society. Congress can counter the
Board's isolation by holding hearings to give voice to a broad spec-
trum of workers representing every sector of the economy. In contrast
to the Board, which refused to even hear oral arguments in a case
potentially affecting millions of workers, members of Congress are di-
rectly accountable to their constituents. Many, if not most, of these
constituents are themselves workers, and have intimate knowledge of
the flattening hierarchies and increasing professionalization of the
workplace. By bringing those workers into the legislative process, Con-
gress can make the statutory definitions of "supervisor" and "profes-
sional employee" relevant and applicable to the present time.
276. Id. at 67-68 (citing the Court's rejection of labor's efforts to adopt safety regula-
tions, restrict the number of hours an employer could require employees to work, and
prohibit antiunion practices such as "yellow dog" contracts).
277. Id. at 68.
278. Id. These efforts culminated in the passage of the Norris-Laguardia Federal Anti-
Injunction Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (2000)), "depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases
'involving or growing out of a labor dispute."' ZIETLOW, supra note 25, at 71.
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